---

Why

The AI agent ecosystem is growing faster than its security tooling. In January 2026 alone:

• 12% of a major agent skill marketplace was malicious (341 of 2,857 community skills)
• A CVSS 8.8 CVE exposed 17,500+ internet-facing instances to one-click RCE
• The Moltbook breach compromised 1.5M API tokens across 770,000 agents

Developers install community skills, connect MCP servers, and configure hooks without any automated way to audit the security of their setup. AgentShield scans your .claude/ directory and flags vulnerabilities before they become exploits.

Built at the Claude Code Hackathon (Cerebral Valley x Anthropic, Feb 2026). Part of the Everything Claude Code ecosystem (42K+ stars).

Quick Start

# Scan your Claude Code config (no install required)
npx ecc-agentshield scan

# Or install globally
npm install -g ecc-agentshield
agentshield scan

That's it. AgentShield auto-discovers your ~/.claude/ directory, scans all config files, and prints a graded security report.

Discovery intentionally skips common generated directories such as node_modules, build output, and .dmux worktree mirrors so transient copies do not duplicate findings.

  AgentShield Security Report

  Grade: F (0/100)

  Score Breakdown
  Secrets        ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 0
  Permissions    ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 0
  Hooks          ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 0
  MCP Servers    ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 0
  Agents         ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 0

  ● CRITICAL  Hardcoded Anthropic API key
    CLAUDE.md:13
    Evidence: sk-ant-a...cdef
    Fix: Replace with environment variable reference [auto-fixable]

  ● CRITICAL  Overly permissive allow rule: Bash(*)
    settings.json
    Evidence: Bash(*)
    Fix: Restrict to specific commands: Bash(git *), Bash(npm *), Bash(node *)

  Summary
  Files scanned: 6
  Findings: 73 total — 19 critical, 29 high, 15 medium, 4 low, 6 info
  Auto-fixable: 8 (use --fix)

More commands

# Scan a specific directory
agentshield scan --path /path/to/.claude

# Auto-fix safe issues (replaces hardcoded secrets with env var references)
agentshield scan --fix

# JSON output for CI pipelines
agentshield scan --format json

# Generate an HTML executive security report
agentshield scan --format html > report.html

# Generate a portable audit bundle
agentshield scan --evidence-pack ./agentshield-evidence

# Three-agent Claude Opus adversarial analysis (requires ANTHROPIC_API_KEY)
agentshield scan --opus --stream

# Generate a secure baseline config
agentshield init

JSON reports now expose findings[].runtimeConfidence when AgentShield can distinguish active runtime config from project-local settings, template/example inventories, installed Claude plugin caches, declarative plugin manifests, and manifest-resolved non-shell hook implementations. Reports also include local harness adapter evidence for Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Zed, VS Code, dmux, terminal-agent wrappers, and project-local templates when matching markers are present.

What It Catches

268 rules across 15 modules, graded A to F with a 0 to 100 numeric score. Recognized defenses are listed and never penalized.

Scoring and recognized defenses

The score starts at 100 per category and only findings deduct from it: critical 25, high 15, medium 5, low 2, info 0. Protective configuration the scanner finds (deny and ask lists, sandbox settings, blocking PreToolUse hooks, read-only agent tool lists, Codex sandbox_mode, Hermes manual approvals, and similar) is listed in every report under "Recognized Defenses" so it gets credit and is visibly never penalized. Defenses do not add points either: the score cannot be gamed by adding decorative deny rules, it can only be lowered by real findings. Guard-pattern findings the permission rules emit at info severity ("Deny/ask rule blocking ...", "Prohibition of ...", "Mention of ...") are enforced to a zero deduction in src/reporter/score.ts.

Secrets Detection

What	Examples
API keys	Anthropic (sk-ant-), OpenAI (sk-proj-/sk-), xAI (xai-), AWS (AKIA), Google/Gemini (AIza), Stripe (sk_test_/sk_live_)
Tokens	GitHub PATs (ghp_/github_pat_), Linear (lin_api_), Cloudflare (CF_API_TOKEN=), Slack (xox[bprs]-), JWTs (eyJ...), Bearer tokens
Credentials	Hardcoded passwords, database connection strings (postgres/mongo/mysql/redis), private key material
Env leaks	Secrets passed through environment variables in configs, echo $SECRET in hooks

Permission Audit (17 rules)

What	Examples
Wildcard access	Bash(*), Write(*), Edit(*) — unrestricted tool permissions
Missing deny lists	No deny rules for rm -rf, sudo, chmod 777
Dangerous flags	--dangerously-skip-permissions usage
Mutable tool exposure	All mutable tools (Write, Edit, Bash) allowed without scoping
Destructive git	git push --force, git reset --hard in allowed commands
Unrestricted network	curl *, wget, ssh *, scp * in allow list without scope

Hook Analysis (40 rules)

What	Examples
Command injection	${file} interpolation in shell commands — attacker-controlled filenames become code
Data exfiltration	curl -X POST with variable interpolation sending data to external URLs
Silent errors	2>/dev/null, || true — failing security hooks that silently pass
Missing hooks	No PreToolUse hooks, no Stop hooks for session-end validation
Network exposure	Unthrottled network requests in hooks, sensitive file access without filtering
Session startup	SessionStart hooks that download and execute remote scripts
Package installs	Global npm install -g, pip install, gem install, cargo install in hooks
Container escape	Docker --privileged, --pid=host, --network=host, root volume mounts
Credential access	macOS Keychain, GNOME Keyring, /etc/shadow reads
Reverse shells	/dev/tcp, mkfifo + nc, Python/Perl socket shells
Clipboard access	pbcopy, xclip, xsel, wl-copy — exfiltration via clipboard
Log tampering	journalctl --vacuum, rm /var/log, history -c — anti-forensics

MCP Server Security (49 rules)

What	Examples
High-risk servers	Shell/command MCPs, filesystem with root access, database MCPs, browser automation
Supply chain	npx -y auto-install without confirmation — typosquatting vector
Hardcoded secrets	API tokens in MCP environment config instead of env var references
Remote transport	MCP servers connecting to remote URLs (SSE/streamable HTTP)
Shell metacharacters	&&, |, ; in MCP server command arguments
Missing metadata	No version pin, no description, excessive server count
Sensitive file args	.env, .pem, credentials.json passed as server arguments
Network exposure	Binding to 0.0.0.0 instead of localhost
Auto-approve	autoApprove settings that skip user confirmation for tool calls
Missing timeouts	High-risk servers without timeout — resource exhaustion risk

Supply-chain verification (agentshield scan --supply-chain) extracts MCP package references plus root package.json and package-lock.json dependency evidence, then reports provenance counts for npm vs git, pinned vs unpinned, known-good packages, and npm-registry-backed metadata. Add --supply-chain-online to query npm for downloads, maintainers, postinstall scripts, deprecation, and package age.

Package-manager hardening checks also scan .npmrc, .yarnrc.yml, and pnpm-workspace.yaml for plaintext registry credentials, explicit dependency lifecycle-script enablement, and missing or weak release-age cooldowns where the package manager supports them. npm configs are checked for lifecycle-script blocking and unsupported release-age keys that can create false confidence; use pnpm minimumReleaseAge / minimum-release-age, Yarn npmMinimalAgeGate, or an external package-manager policy wrapper for cooldown enforcement.

AgentShield also scans AI developer-tool persistence surfaces used by recent npm and PyPI campaign payloads, including Claude Code hook settings, .claude/router_runtime.js, VS Code tasks.json folder-open automation, Zed project tasks.json, .vscode/setup.mjs, .zed/setup.mjs, GitHub workflow drop-ins, LaunchAgent/systemd dead-man switch artifacts, gh-token-monitor token-store files, metadata-service credential targets, and reported exfiltration or second-stage network indicators. These indicators are emitted as critical hook findings so CI can fail fast even after the malicious package has been uninstalled.

MCP Confidence Notes

AgentShield scans both active MCP config and repository-shipped MCP templates.

• Findings from .mcp.json, mcp.json, .claude/mcp.json, .claude.json, and active settings.json are highest-confidence runtime exposure only under active Claude configuration roots; copies in docs, examples, or template directories are classified separately.
• Findings from settings.local.json are emitted as runtimeConfidence: project-local-optional.
• Findings from locations such as mcp-configs/, config/mcp/, or configs/mcp/ indicate risky MCP definitions present in repository templates, not guaranteed active runtime enablement.
• JSON, markdown, terminal, and HTML outputs now expose source context via runtimeConfidence: active-runtime | project-local-optional | template-example | docs-example | plugin-cache | plugin-manifest | hook-code.
• Non-secret template-example MCP findings are score-weighted at 0.25x, and one template file is capped at 10 deduction points per score category so a single MCP catalog cannot score like dozens of enabled servers.
• In template files, findings such as risky server type, remote URL transport, npx -y, unpinned packages, and environment inheritance are still valuable, but they should be interpreted as "this repo ships a risky MCP template" rather than "this MCP is definitely enabled right now."
• Aggregate findings like large MCP server counts are especially likely to overstate runtime exposure when the source file is a template catalog.

Agent Config Review (41 rules)

What	Examples
Unrestricted tools	Agents with Bash access, no allowedTools restriction
Prompt injection surface	Agents processing external/user-provided content without defenses
Auto-run instructions	CLAUDE.md containing "Always run", "without asking", "automatically install"
Hidden instructions	Unicode zero-width characters, HTML comments, base64-encoded directives
URL execution	CLAUDE.md instructing agents to fetch and execute remote URLs
Time bombs	Delayed execution instructions triggered by time or absence conditions
Data harvesting	Bulk collection of passwords, credentials, or database dumps
Prompt reflection	ignore previous instructions, you are now, DAN jailbreak, fake system prompts
Output manipulation	always report ok, remove warnings from output, suppress security findings

Structured JSON under .claude/subagents/ and .claude/slash-commands/ is analyzed like agent config when it declares allowedTools or similar tool metadata. Slash commands under commands/ and slash-commands/ are typed command-md: they get the injection and dangerous-instruction rules but not the skill packaging hygiene rules, which only apply to SKILL.md. Freeform skill-md prompt text still has narrower security coverage than agent-md and CLAUDE.md.

Scanner Accuracy Notes

• Live audit notes and follow-up items are tracked in false-positive-audit.md.
• The most useful operator guidance is in the audit's Triage Rules For Current Reports section.
• The audit doc also includes a reusable False-Positive Taxonomy, Repo Audit Worksheet, and Release Gate For Accuracy Changes.
• Cross-file hook-manifest awareness now suppresses settings-only hooks-no-pretooluse when a companion hooks/hooks.json manifest defines PreToolUse hooks.
• Manifest-referenced hook implementations are now discovered from hooks/hooks.json-style indirection; shell targets continue through hook rules, and non-shell hook-code targets now emit targeted findings for explicit output(...) context injection, transcript input access, and remote shell payloads executed via child-process wrappers.
• Current known high-signal caveats are broader non-shell hook execution that still needs language-aware analysis beyond those current hook-code signals, and skill-md prompt text that still bypasses most agent/injection rules.
• runtimeConfidence now appears on MCP findings, settings.local.json, docs/examples, installed Claude plugin caches, plugin manifests, and manifest-resolved non-shell hook code. Scoring discounts non-secret template-example and docs-example findings at 0.25x, non-secret project-local-optional findings at 0.75x, and non-secret plugin-cache / plugin-manifest findings at 0.5x. Non-secret template-example findings are also capped at 10 deduction points per file and score category so one catalog file cannot dominate the grade. hook-code findings currently stay at full weight, but the active rules there are narrow language-aware implementation signals.
• Practical reading rule: template-example means "repo ships this risky template", not "this is definitely enabled right now."
• Practical reading rule: docs-example means "repo ships risky sample guidance", not "this example is active runtime config."
• Practical reading rule: plugin-cache means "installed plugin content is present on disk", not "this file is top-level runtime config"; real secrets still stay critical.
• Practical reading rule: plugin-manifest means "the repo declares this hook behavior", while hook-code means "the scanner reached the referenced non-shell implementation."
• Current edge case: docs-only example trees now re-add the standalone CLAUDE.md example file for scanning, but still suppress the rest of the nested example subtree unless a runtime companion exists.
• Current edge case: tutorial/example bundles outside the current docs/, commands/, examples/, samples/, demo/, tutorial/, guide/, cookbook/, and playground/ heuristics can still be treated as live config until broader example-root classification lands.
• Docs-only nested CLAUDE.md roots under docs/ are now skipped unless runtime config companions exist in the same subtree.
• Exact Bash(curl https://...) and Bash(wget https://...) allow entries with pinned literal URLs no longer trigger the generic permissions-permissive-* finding; wildcard and dynamic network permissions still do.
• Exact Bash(node scripts/foo.js ...) and Bash(python3 ./tools/audit.py ...) wrapper commands no longer trigger the generic interpreter-access finding; inline eval forms such as node -e and python -c still do.
• Exact read-only Docker inventory commands such as Bash(docker ps) and Bash(docker image ls) no longer trigger the generic Docker-access finding; execution-oriented forms such as docker run and docker exec still do.
• Exact settings.local.json allowlists now downgrade permissions-no-deny-list from high to medium when every allow entry is fully specified; wildcard or dynamic project-local permissions still keep the higher severity.
• Exact local-only settings.local.json allowlists now also downgrade hooks-no-pretooluse from medium to low; broader or network-capable project-local configs still keep the higher severity.
• Comment-only shell-hook lines are now ignored by the hook exfiltration, sensitive-path, and silent-fail regex rules, so inline remediation notes and commented examples no longer look like live hook behavior.
• Narrow specialist agents, subagents, and slash commands now downgrade generic Bash-access and escalation-chain findings from high to medium; broader generalist workflows still keep the higher severity.
• Repo-scoped filesystem MCP servers using relative paths like ./ now grade lower than unrestricted root/home filesystem access; root-level filesystem exposure still stays high.
• Defensive agent-review content that mentions patterns like fetch(userProvidedUrl) no longer triggers agents-injection-surface; direct instructions to fetch/process external content still do.
• agents-explorer-write now uses role metadata and the lead agent intro instead of any later workflow/example text, so procedural search for ... steps in normal worker prompts no longer get mislabeled as explorer-style agents. Example: chief-of-staff.md no longer trips that rule just because it contains gog gmail search ....
• agents-oversized-prompt now measures effective prompt size instead of raw file length, discounting fenced code blocks and Markdown tables. Example-heavy agents like chief-of-staff.md and planner.md no longer trip the rule, while prose-heavy agents still do.
• Markdown example/test passwords in example-like paths such as docs/, commands/, examples/, tutorials/, and demos/ are now suppressed when the surrounding context is clearly instructional; that suppression does not apply to normal agent/config markdown.

False-Positive Audit Workflow

Use this workflow when a repo scan looks noisy or when you are tuning AgentShield rules.

1. Start with JSON output so you can inspect file paths, runtimeConfidence, and score impact directly.
2. Separate active runtime findings from lower-confidence source kinds before changing any rules.
3. Validate suspected false positives against at least one real repo and one minimal synthetic fixture.
4. Prefer source-aware reclassification and wording changes before adding blanket suppression.
5. Keep real secrets and explicit execution paths visible even inside examples, manifests, or templates.
6. Re-run targeted tests, then the full gate, before changing release behavior.

Recommended commands:

agentshield scan --path /repo --format json > report.json

jq '.findings | group_by(.runtimeConfidence // "none") | map({
  runtimeConfidence: (.[0].runtimeConfidence // "none"),
  count: length
})' report.json

jq '.findings | group_by(.file) | map({
  file: .[0].file,
  count: length
}) | sort_by(-.count)[:20]' report.json

Confidence-first triage commands:

# Highest-signal findings first: active runtime + project-local
jq '.findings
  | map(select((.runtimeConfidence // "active-runtime") | IN("active-runtime","project-local-optional")))
  | map(select(.severity | IN("critical","high","medium")))
  | map({file, severity, runtimeConfidence, title})' report.json

# Lower-confidence inventory that usually needs interpretation, not suppression
jq '.findings
  | map(select((.runtimeConfidence // "") | IN("template-example","docs-example","plugin-cache","plugin-manifest")))
  | map({file, severity, runtimeConfidence, title})' report.json

Recommended audit order:

• active-runtime and project-local-optional: treat as highest-signal findings first.
• template-example, docs-example, and plugin-cache: confirm whether the repo or installed plugin cache is shipping risky guidance versus actually enabling it.
• plugin-manifest: confirm whether the risk is in declarative hook wiring or the referenced implementation.
• hook-code: confirm whether the implementation actually injects context, reads transcripts, or shells out in a risky way.

Rule-design guidelines:

• Prefer source-aware labeling over suppression. If a finding is real but lower confidence, keep it visible and say why.
• Prefer cross-file context over single-file guesses. Companion manifests and referenced hook implementations usually matter more than isolated config.
• Prefer narrow, behavior-based hook-code rules over generic wrapper heuristics. spawnSync("bash", ["-lc", "curl ... | bash"]) is high-signal; ordinary spawnSync("prettier", ...) is not.
• Do not downgrade real secrets just because they appear in docs or examples. Structural findings can be downgraded; committed credentials should stay critical.
• Keep example-root heuristics evidence-based. Today the scanner treats docs/, commands/, examples/, example/, samples/, sample/, demo/, demos/, tutorial/, tutorials/, guide/, guides/, cookbook/, and playground/ as example-like paths.

When you change rule accuracy, update both:

• false-positive-audit.md with the new baseline and remaining gaps
• the targeted regression tests for the specific rule family you changed
• agentshield scan --corpus-gate in CI so the built-in attack corpus must stay fully detected; failed corpus gates now include a prioritized accuracy improvement plan by category, missing rule, and missed config
• the corpus now includes an env proxy/DNS exfiltration fixture so proxy hijack, runtime import mutation, env-token exfiltration, credential-store access, and clipboard access stay covered together
• if you are filing a scanner-noise bug, start from the audit doc's False-Positive Issue Template

Reducing False Positives In Practice

The current scan profile is not dominated by broken matchers. It is mostly dominated by lower-confidence source kinds that need different interpretation.

Current patterns from the latest live scans:

• template MCP inventory is still the biggest noise source by count in everything-claude-code
• example/tutorial config needs example-aware wording and weighting, not blanket suppression
• declarative hook manifests and executable hook implementations need different handling
• many remaining agent findings are policy findings about intentionally privileged agents, not obvious rule bugs
• the latest alert review reduced specialist agent-capability severity inflation, repo-scoped filesystem MCP inflation, and template-catalog score inflation; remaining noise is now mostly template count/interpretation and active-runtime remote MCP URLs

Recurring pattern signatures to recognize:

• one template file dominating the report usually means confidence/weighting work, not a broken matcher
• broad agents-* clusters across files with explicit tool metadata usually mean policy review, not false-positive suppression
• very small project-local-optional clusters usually mean scope is already modeled and only severity may need tuning
• a repo-scoped filesystem MCP with relative-path args should not be treated like root/home filesystem access

When to open a false-positive issue instead of just triaging the report:

• the same finding pattern reproduces across at least one real repo and one minimal synthetic fixture
• the finding is wrong for its own source kind, not just lower-confidence than active-runtime
• the fix needs matcher changes, not just better wording, score weighting, or cross-file context
• the finding would still be misleading even after reading runtimeConfidence

Recommended operating model:

• Start with runtimeConfidence before changing any rule. Separate active-runtime from template-example, docs-example, plugin-cache, plugin-manifest, and project-local-optional.
• Reclassify before suppressing. If the finding is real but lower confidence, keep it visible and adjust wording or score weight instead of hiding it.
• Keep secrets on a stricter standard. Real credentials should stay critical even in docs, examples, plugin caches, or manifests.
• Use cross-file context whenever possible. Settings, manifests, and referenced hook implementations usually need to be read together.
• For hook-code, add only narrow language-aware rules for explicit risky behavior. Avoid broad wrapper heuristics.
• For agent rules, anchor on role metadata and lead instructions before matching arbitrary later prose.

Repo conventions that help AgentShield scan accurately:

• put reusable MCP catalogs under template paths such as mcp-configs/ instead of live runtime config files
• keep local-only overrides in settings.local.json
• keep tutorials and examples under example-like paths such as docs/, examples/, tutorials/, demos/, or guides/
• keep hooks/hooks.json declarative and put the implementation in separate hook script files
• keep large agent examples inside fenced code blocks so prompt-size and role heuristics stay accurate

Current high-value places to audit first:

• files with the highest finding count
• files with runtimeConfidence: template-example or plugin-cache
• settings.local.json findings that may be project-local rather than repo-wide
• plugin-manifest findings that need confirmation in the referenced implementation
• hook-code findings that involve context injection, transcript access, or child-process execution

Features

Auto-Fix Engine (--fix)

Automatically applies safe fixes:

• Replaces hardcoded secrets with ${ENV_VAR} references
• Tightens wildcard permissions (Bash(*) → scoped Bash(git *), Bash(npm *))

Only fixes marked auto: true are applied. Permission changes require human review.

Verify-after-fix: --fix does not trust itself. After applying fixes it re-scans the target, and if the posture score regressed or a new high/critical finding appeared (the kind of churn a naive permission tighten can cause), it rolls every modified file back to its original content. On success it prints a tamper-evident attestation digest binding the before/after score and finding deltas, so the kept fixes are provably non-regressing.

External Rule Packs (--rule-pack)

Run community or private detection rules alongside the built-ins, without recompiling:

agentshield scan --rule-pack ./my-pack.json
agentshield scan --rule-pack ./pack-a.json --rule-pack ./pack-b.json   # repeatable

A pack is a JSON file validated with the same fail-closed approach as --policy (bad JSON, schema violations, duplicate ids, or an uncompilable regex abort the scan):

{
  "version": 1,
  "name": "my-pack",
  "rules": [
    {
      "id": "tool-poisoning-001",
      "name": "Tool description poisoning",
      "description": "Hidden instruction in a tool description",
      "severity": "high",
      "category": "injection",
      "patterns": ["ignore (?:all )?previous instructions"],
      "fileTypes": ["agent-md", "claude-md"]
    }
  ]
}

Each pattern is a JS regex run against file content; fileTypes is optional and scopes a rule to specific config types. External findings count toward the overall grade. Anyone with a pack in this shape can plug in.

Secure Init (agentshield init)

Generates a hardened .claude/ directory with scoped permissions, safety hooks, and security best practices. Existing files are never overwritten.

Claude Opus Deep Analysis (--opus)

Three-agent adversarial pipeline powered by Claude Opus (claude-opus-5 by default; the injection tester uses claude-sonnet-5):

1. Red Team (Attacker) — finds exploitable attack vectors and multi-step chains
2. Blue Team (Defender) — evaluates existing protections and recommends hardening
3. Auditor — synthesizes both perspectives into a prioritized risk assessment

The Attacker finds that curl hooks with ${file} interpolation + Bash(*) = command injection pivot. The Defender notes no PreToolUse hooks exist to stop it. The Auditor chains them into a prioritized action list.

agentshield scan --opus              # Red + Blue run in parallel
agentshield scan --opus --stream     # Sequential with real-time output
agentshield scan --opus --stream -v  # Verbose — see full agent reasoning

  ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓
  ┃  Phase 1a: ATTACKER (Red Team)                       ┃
  ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛

  ✓ Attacker analysis complete (4521 tokens)

  ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓
  ┃  Phase 1b: DEFENDER (Blue Team)                      ┃
  ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛

  ✓ Defender analysis complete (3892 tokens)

  ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓
  ┃  Phase 2: AUDITOR                                    ┃
  ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛

  Risk Level: CRITICAL
  Opus Score: █████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 15/100

Requires ANTHROPIC_API_KEY environment variable.

OrcaRouter provider

The --opus and --injection analysis modes can also run through OrcaRouter, an OpenAI/Anthropic-compatible gateway that routes each request to the most cost-effective upstream model:

export ORCAROUTER_API_KEY=your-key-here
agentshield scan --opus --provider orcarouter
agentshield scan --injection --provider orcarouter

The provider points the Anthropic client at https://api.orcarouter.ai and uses the gateway's namespaced model ids (e.g. anthropic/claude-sonnet-5, anthropic/claude-opus-5). The default provider remains Anthropic.

With --provider orcarouter the scanned configuration contents are sent to OrcaRouter's API instead of Anthropic's, so do not use it on configs containing secrets you have not redacted.

Compliance Mapping (--compliance)

Map findings to audit-framework control IDs so GRC teams get an auditor-ready coverage artifact instead of a raw findings list:

agentshield scan --compliance soc2          # SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria
agentshield scan --compliance pci,iso       # comma-separated
agentshield scan --compliance all           # SOC 2 + PCI DSS + ISO 27001

Each framework prints a control-coverage table (control id, title, highest severity, finding count, examples), ordered by severity:

## Compliance Mapping: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)

Mapped 194/194 findings to 5 control(s). 0 finding(s) had no mapped control.

| Control | Title                        | Highest  | Findings | Examples |
| CC6.1   | Logical access - credentials | critical | 76       | Hardcoded Anthropic API key; ... |

Mapping is finding-category-level guidance (SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A), not a certified crosswalk; confirm control applicability with your auditor.

Output Formats

Format	Flag	Use Case
Terminal	--format terminal (default)	Interactive use
JSON	--format json	CI pipelines, programmatic access
Markdown	--format markdown	Documentation, PRs
HTML	--format html	Executive report with risk posture and priorities
Evidence pack	--evidence-pack <dir>	Audit and buyer reviews
Remediation plan	--remediation-plan <path>	Stable-fingerprint fix queue for CI and ticketing

Evidence packs write a deterministic directory containing manifest.json, README.md, agentshield-report.json, agentshield-report.html, agentshield-results.sarif, policy-evaluation.json, baseline-comparison.json, supply-chain.json, and ci-context.json, and remediation-plan.json. The manifest records SHA-256 digests and byte counts for bundle artifacts plus a bundle digest over the machine-readable evidence. ci-context.json records whitelisted GitHub Actions workflow, commit, run, and runner provenance without copying arbitrary environment variables into the bundle. Redaction is enabled by default for local paths, usernames, emails, and token-shaped strings; use --no-evidence-redact only for private internal bundles.

Remediation plans write a JSON queue of findings with stable hashed fingerprints, severity, file, fixability, ordered workflow phases, and the recommended next command. The workflow phases route safe auto-fixes first, manual-review findings second, and verification last so maintainers can attach the plan to CI tickets without turning every finding into a separate thread. They intentionally omit raw evidence and fix before/after values so teams can attach the plan to tickets without copying token-shaped strings.

Verify a saved evidence pack before attaching it to CI artifacts or customer handoffs:

agentshield evidence-pack verify ./agentshield-evidence
agentshield evidence-pack verify ./agentshield-evidence --json

Inspect a verified evidence pack when a downstream GitHub App, Linear sync, or security-review workflow needs a compact readback without opening every artifact:

agentshield evidence-pack inspect ./agentshield-evidence
agentshield evidence-pack inspect ./agentshield-evidence --json

Aggregate multiple verified evidence packs when an operator needs fleet-level routing across repos, teams, or harnesses. The JSON output includes operatorReadback for promotion status/digest checks and reviewItems with source evidence paths and owner-ready recommendations for packs that need follow-up:

agentshield evidence-pack fleet ./repo-a-evidence ./repo-b-evidence
agentshield evidence-pack fleet ./repo-a-evidence ./repo-b-evidence --json

operatorReadback is the stable field for downstream GitHub App, Linear, or ECC Tools routing. It reports ready, status, digest, owner counts, blocking review counts, approval routes, deterministic approvalIds, and the next operator action so fleet promotion can be gated without parsing terminal prose. Each review item also carries the same approvalId plus a Linear-friendly ticket externalId, allowing sync jobs to dedupe owner approval threads across reruns.

JSON Report Shape

agentshield scan --format json is the supported machine-readable scanner interface today.

{
  "timestamp": "2026-03-13T19:42:00.000Z",
  "targetPath": "/repo/.claude",
  "score": {
    "grade": "C",
    "numericScore": 66,
    "breakdown": {
      "secrets": 100,
      "permissions": 70,
      "hooks": 80,
      "mcp": 35,
      "agents": 45
    }
  },
  "summary": {
    "totalFindings": 29,
    "critical": 1,
    "high": 7,
    "medium": 8,
    "low": 10,
    "info": 3,
    "filesScanned": 17,
    "autoFixable": 2,
    "defenses": 4
  },
  "defenses": [
    {
      "id": "defense-deny-list",
      "title": "Permission deny list",
      "file": ".claude/settings.json",
      "detail": "6 deny rules; covers .env, ~/.ssh, curl, sudo, rm -rf. Deny wins over allow regardless of specificity.",
      "harness": "claude-code"
    }
  ],
  "findings": [
    {
      "id": "mcp-risky-filesystem",
      "severity": "medium",
      "category": "mcp",
      "title": "Template defines risky MCP server: filesystem",
      "description": "Repository template includes a high-risk filesystem MCP server.",
      "file": "mcp-configs/mcp-servers.json",
      "runtimeConfidence": "template-example"
    }
  ]
}

Notes:

• runtimeConfidence is emitted for active runtime config, settings.local.json, docs/examples, installed Claude plugin caches, plugin manifests, and manifest-resolved non-shell hook code.
• harnessAdapters is local marker evidence only. It does not call external services or imply a hosted/team entitlement.
• Adapter confidence is strong when a primary harness marker exists, and partial when only supporting directories or secondary markers are present.
• active-runtime means active config such as .mcp.json, mcp.json, .claude/mcp.json, .claude.json, or active settings.json.
• project-local-optional means project-local settings such as settings.local.json.
• template-example means template/catalog files such as mcp-configs/ or config/mcp/.
• docs-example means docs/tutorial/example content such as docs/guide/settings.json or commands/*.md.
• plugin-cache means installed Claude plugin cache content such as .claude/plugins/cache/....
• plugin-manifest means declarative hook manifests such as hooks/hooks.json.
• hook-code means a manifest-resolved non-shell implementation such as scripts/hooks/session-start.js.
• Recognized defenses (defenses[] in JSON, "Recognized Defenses" in terminal and markdown) are credited, never penalized, and never add points.
• Score weighting discounts non-secret template-example and docs-example findings to 0.25x, non-secret project-local-optional findings to 0.75x, and non-secret plugin-cache / plugin-manifest findings to 0.5x; committed secrets still count at full weight. Non-secret template-example findings are also capped at 10 deduction points per file and score category. See false-positive-audit.md.

API Reference

AgentShield currently has three distinct automation surfaces:

• CLI: agentshield scan, agentshield init, and agentshield miniclaw start
• Scanner report JSON/SARIF: agentshield scan --format json or agentshield scan --format sarif --output agentshield.sarif
• Organization policy gate: agentshield scan --policy agentshield-policy.json
• MiniClaw package + HTTP API: ecc-agentshield/miniclaw

Important packaging note:

• The npm package root export currently points at the CLI entrypoint, not a semver-stable scanner library module.
• Internal scanner modules such as src/scanner/index.ts and src/reporter/score.ts are useful for contributors, but they should not be documented as supported import paths for package consumers yet.
• If you need automation around scanner results today, prefer the JSON report format over importing scanner internals from the package root.

Detailed request/response and schema notes live in API.md.

GitHub Action

- name: AgentShield Security Scan
  uses: affaan-m/agentshield@v1
  with:
    path: "."
    min-severity: "medium"
    fail-on-findings: "true"

Inputs:

Input	Default	Description
path	.	Path to scan
min-severity	medium	Minimum severity: critical, high, medium, low, info
fail-on-findings	true	Fail the action if findings meet severity threshold
format	terminal	Output format: terminal, json, markdown, sarif
sarif-output	agentshield-results.sarif	SARIF output path when format is sarif
baseline	""	Optional AgentShield baseline JSON path for drift comparison
save-baseline	""	Optional path to write the current scan as a new baseline
policy	""	Optional organization policy JSON path
fail-on-policy	true	Fail the action if the organization policy is non-compliant
supply-chain	true	Verify MCP npm/git package provenance and known malicious package risk
supply-chain-online	false	Query npm registry metadata during supply-chain verification
fail-on-supply-chain	follows fail-on-findings	Fail the action when supply-chain verification finds critical or high package risks
evidence-pack	""	Optional directory for a portable audit evidence bundle
verify-evidence-pack	true	Verify evidence-pack artifact hashes after writing
policy-promotion-manifest	""	Optional policy export manifest to verify and promote or dry-run
policy-promotion-pack	""	Policy pack id when the manifest contains multiple packs
policy-promotion-output	.agentshield/policy.json	Active policy path to write when promotion dry-run is disabled
policy-promotion-dry-run	true	Verify promotion review evidence without writing the active policy
fail-on-policy-promotion	false	Fail when promotion review items still require action

Outputs: score (0–100), grade (A–F), total-findings, critical-count, sarif-path, baseline-path, baseline-status, new-findings, resolved-findings, unchanged-findings, score-delta, policy-status, policy-violations, policy-promotion-status, policy-promotion-pack, policy-promotion-review-items, policy-promotion-action-required-count, policy-promotion-digest, supply-chain-status, supply-chain-risky-packages, supply-chain-critical-count, supply-chain-high-count, package-manager-hardening-status, package-manager-hardening-findings, package-manager-hardening-critical-count, package-manager-hardening-high-count, package-manager-hardening-registry-credentials, package-manager-hardening-lifecycle-scripts, package-manager-hardening-release-age-gates, evidence-pack-path, evidence-pack-status, evidence-pack-digest

The action writes a markdown job summary and emits GitHub annotations inline on affected files. When format: sarif is set, it also writes a SARIF 2.1.0 report that can be uploaded to GitHub code scanning with github/codeql-action/upload-sarif. When baseline is set, the action appends a baseline drift summary, emits regression annotations for new findings, and reports baseline-status as passed, failed, missing, or not-run. When policy is set, the SARIF report includes organization-policy violations as agentshield-policy/* code-scanning results, appends the organization policy result to the job summary, emits policy violation annotations, and fails by default unless fail-on-policy: "false" is set. When policy-promotion-manifest is set, the action verifies the selected policy export digest, emits promotion review-item counts, appends the owner/protected-rollout/runtime-smoke review items to the job summary, and marks runtime smoke as verified when the same job also scans with the promoted policy. Supply-chain verification runs offline by default for MCP package references, appends package-risk evidence to the job summary, writes real supply-chain.json evidence packs, and fails on critical/high package risk whenever the action is in failing mode unless fail-on-supply-chain: "false" is set. Package-manager hardening outputs and job-summary evidence separately count plaintext registry credentials, lifecycle-script drift, and release-age gate drift so CI and hosted consumers can route supply-chain configuration risk even when the main finding gate is collecting evidence only.

Baseline drift gate:

- name: AgentShield Drift Gate
  uses: affaan-m/agentshield@v1
  with:
    path: "."
    baseline: ".github/agentshield-baseline.json"
    fail-on-findings: "false"

Use fail-on-findings: "false" when the workflow should fail only on drift from the baseline. Keep the default fail-on-findings: "true" when any current finding at or above min-severity should still fail the action.

CLI Reference

agentshield scan [options]         Scan configuration directory
  -p, --path <path>                Path to scan (default: ~/.claude or cwd)
  -f, --format <format>            Output: terminal, json, markdown, html, sarif
  -o, --output <path>              Write the primary report output to a file
  --fix                            Auto-apply safe fixes
  --opus                           Enable Claude Opus multi-agent analysis
  --provider <provider>            LLM provider for --opus/--injection: anthropic or orcarouter
  --stream                         Stream Opus analysis in real-time
  --injection                      Run active prompt injection testing
  --sandbox                        Execute hooks in a sandbox and observe behavior
  --taint                          Run taint analysis (data flow tracking)
  --deep                           Run injection + sandbox + taint + opus together
  --log <path>                     Write structured scan logs to a file
  --log-format <format>            Log format: ndjson or json
  --corpus                         Run built-in attack corpus benchmark
  --corpus-gate                    Fail if the built-in attack corpus regresses
  --baseline <path>                Compare against a baseline file
  --save-baseline <path>           Save current scan results as a baseline file
  --gate                           Fail on new critical/high findings or score drop
  --supply-chain                   Verify MCP package provenance and risk
  --supply-chain-online            Include npm registry metadata
  --compliance <frameworks>        Map findings to controls: soc2, pci, iso, all

  --rule-pack <path>               Load an external JSON rule pack (repeatable)
  --policy <path>                  Validate against an organization policy
  --evidence-pack <dir>            Write portable evidence bundle
  --remediation-plan <path>        Write stable-fingerprint JSON remediation plan
  --no-evidence-redact             Disable evidence-pack redaction
  --min-severity <severity>        Filter: critical, high, medium, low, info
  -v, --verbose                    Show detailed output

agentshield init                   Generate secure baseline config
agentshield baseline write         Write a scan baseline JSON file
agentshield evidence-pack fleet    Summarize multiple evidence packs for routing
agentshield evidence-pack inspect  Verify and summarize an evidence bundle
agentshield evidence-pack verify   Verify artifact and bundle digests
agentshield policy export          Export policy packs plus checksum manifest
agentshield policy init            Generate an organization policy preset
agentshield policy promote         Verify and promote an exported policy

Report footer CTA: terminal and markdown reports can append a one-line ECC Tools Pro footer. It is off by default. Set AGENTSHIELD_CTA=1 (or ECC_CTA=1) to enable it; set AGENTSHIELD_NO_CTA=1 (or ECC_NO_CTA=1) to hard-suppress it, which wins over opt-in. JSON and SARIF output never include it.

Baseline write:

agentshield baseline write --path .claude --output .github/agentshield-baseline.json
agentshield baseline write --path .claude --output baseline.json --json

The baseline command is a first-class wrapper around the existing scan baseline format. New baselines store stable hashed evidence fingerprints and omit raw evidence values, so teams can keep baseline snapshots in CI without copying token-shaped strings into long-lived artifacts. Existing raw-evidence baselines remain comparable during migration. Use it to create the accepted snapshot, then compare future scans with agentshield scan --baseline .github/agentshield-baseline.json --gate.

Runtime monitor lifecycle:

# Install the PreToolUse runtime monitor
agentshield runtime install

# Check whether the hook, policy, and log path are healthy
agentshield runtime status --check

# Back up invalid runtime files and restore a healthy install
agentshield runtime repair

Organization policy files support enterprise metadata and temporary exceptions:

agentshield policy init --pack enterprise --owner security-platform@acme.example
agentshield policy init --pack regulated --name "Acme Regulated Policy"
agentshield policy export --output-dir .github/agentshield-policies --owner security-platform@acme.example
agentshield policy export --pack ci-enforcement --name-prefix "Acme" --json
agentshield policy promote --manifest .github/agentshield-policies/manifest.json --pack ci-enforcement --output .agentshield/policy.json
agentshield policy promote --manifest .github/agentshield-policies/manifest.json --pack ci-enforcement --dry-run --json

Policy pack presets are starter baselines, not hidden SaaS policy. oss keeps public repos permissive while requiring destructive-command deny entries; team adds the runtime hook; enterprise raises score gates and blocks broad tool allowlists; regulated disallows critical/high findings and bans broader MCP/tool surfaces; high-risk-hooks-mcp focuses on hook/MCP-heavy repos; and ci-enforcement is tuned for branch-protection evidence.

Policy export writes one JSON policy file per selected pack plus a manifest.json containing SHA-256 digests. This gives platform teams a stable artifact bundle for branch-protection review, audit attachment, or downstream policy promotion without relying on generated console output.

Policy promotion is the review gate for those exported bundles. It reads the export manifest, verifies the selected policy file digest, validates the policy schema, and only then writes the active policy path. Use --dry-run --json in review workflows to prove the exact pack, source file, output path, owner list, and digest before a protected branch or operator copies the policy into place. Promotion results also include reviewItems for owner approval, protected PR rollout, and the runtime smoke test needed before enabling an enforcing CI gate.

{
  "version": 1,
  "name": "Acme Corp Security Policy",
  "policy_pack": "enterprise",
  "owners": ["security-platform@acme.example"],
  "min_score": 85,
  "max_severity": "high",
  "required_deny_list": ["Bash(rm -rf"],
  "exceptions": [
    {
      "id": "AS-EX-001",
      "rule": "required_hooks",
      "owner": "security-platform@acme.example",
      "reason": "Legacy repository migration window",
      "expires_at": "2026-06-30T23:59:59.000Z",
      "scope": "agentshield",
      "ticket": "SEC-1234"
    }
  ]
}

Policy evaluation now includes an exception lifecycle audit in terminal output and GitHub Action summaries: total exceptions, active exceptions, exceptions expiring within seven days, expired exceptions, owners, tickets, scopes, and days until expiry. This keeps temporary waivers visible in branch-protection evidence instead of letting them become silent permanent bypasses.

Exit codes:

• 0: scan completed without critical findings
• 1: CLI usage or runtime error
• 2: scan completed and found at least one critical issue

Security Rules Summary

Category	Rules	Patterns	Severity Range
Secrets	10	14	Critical -- Medium
Permissions	10	--	Critical -- Medium
Hooks	34	--	Critical -- Low
MCP Servers	23	--	Critical -- Info
Agents	25	--	Critical -- Info
Total	102	14

Architecture

src/
├── index.ts              CLI entry point (commander)
├── action.ts             GitHub Action entry point
├── types.ts              Type system + Zod schemas
├── scanner/
│   ├── discovery.ts      Config file discovery
│   └── index.ts          Scan orchestrator
├── rules/
│   ├── index.ts          Rule registry
│   ├── secrets.ts        Secret detection (10 rules, 14 patterns)
│   ├── permissions.ts    Permission audit (17 rules)
│   ├── mcp.ts            MCP server security (26 rules)
│   ├── hooks.ts          Hook analysis (40 rules)
│   └── agents.ts         Agent config review (41 rules)
├── reporter/
│   ├── score.ts          Scoring engine (A-F grades)
│   ├── terminal.ts       Color terminal output
│   ├── json.ts           JSON + Markdown output
│   └── html.ts           Self-contained HTML report
├── fixer/
│   ├── transforms.ts     Fix transforms (secret, permission, generic)
│   └── index.ts          Fix engine orchestrator
├── init/
│   └── index.ts          Secure config generator
└── opus/
    ├── prompts.ts        Attacker/Defender/Auditor system prompts
    ├── pipeline.ts       Three-agent Claude Opus pipeline
    └── render.ts         Opus analysis rendering

MiniClaw

MiniClaw is a minimal, sandboxed AI agent runtime bundled with AgentShield. Where typical agent platforms expose many attack surfaces (Telegram, Discord, email, community plugins), MiniClaw presents a single HTTP endpoint backed by an isolated sandbox.

# Start with secure defaults (localhost:3847, no network, safe tools only)
npx ecc-agentshield miniclaw start

# Custom configuration
npx ecc-agentshield miniclaw start --port 4000 --network localhost --rate-limit 20

Or use as a library:

import { startMiniClaw } from 'ecc-agentshield/miniclaw';

const { server, stop } = startMiniClaw();
// Listening on http://localhost:3847

MiniClaw-specific package exports and HTTP endpoints are documented in src/miniclaw/README.md and summarized in API.md. The React dashboard source lives in src/miniclaw/dashboard.tsx, but it is not yet published as a separate npm subpath.

Security Model

Four independently enforced layers:

Request → [Rate Limit] → [CORS] → [Size Cap] → [Sanitize Prompt]
                                                       ↓
                                                 [Tool Whitelist]
                                                       ↓
                                                   [Sandbox FS]
                                                       ↓
                                                 [Filter Output] → Response

• Server — Rate limiting (10 req/min/IP), CORS, 10KB request cap, localhost-only binding
• Prompt Router — Strips 12+ injection pattern categories (system prompt overrides, identity reassignment, jailbreaks, data exfiltration URLs, zero-width Unicode, base64 payloads)
• Tool Whitelist — Three tiers: Safe (read/search/list), Guarded (write/edit), Restricted (bash/network — disabled by default)
• Sandbox — Isolated filesystem per session, path traversal blocked, symlink escape detection, extension whitelist, 10MB file cap, 5-min timeout, no network by default

HTTP API

Method	Endpoint	Description
POST	/api/prompt	Send a prompt
POST	/api/session	Create a sandboxed session
GET	/api/session	Session info
DELETE	/api/session/:id	Destroy session + cleanup
GET	/api/events/:sessionId	Security audit events
GET	/api/health	Health check

MiniClaw has zero external runtime dependencies — Node.js built-ins only (http, fs, path, crypto). The optional React dashboard requires React 18+ as a peer dependency.

Development

npm install          # Install dependencies
npm run dev          # Development mode
npm test             # Run tests
npm run test:coverage # Coverage report
npm run typecheck    # Type check
npm run build        # Build
npm run scan:demo    # Demo scan against vulnerable examples

Distribution

AgentShield is available through multiple channels:

Channel	Use Case	Install
Standalone CLI	Direct scanning from your terminal	npm install -g ecc-agentshield or npx ecc-agentshield scan
GitHub Action	Automated security checks on PRs in CI/CD	uses: affaan-m/agentshield@v1
ECC Plugin	Claude Code users via the ECC skill ecosystem	Install through Everything Claude Code
ECC Tools GitHub App	Integrated scanning across your GitHub org	Install at github.com/apps/ecc-tools
ECC Tools Pro	GitHub App with automated repo analysis, Stripe billing ($19/seat/mo)	Install

FAQ

What is AgentShield?

AgentShield is a security auditor for AI agent configurations. It scans Claude Code setups for hardcoded secrets, permission misconfigs, hook injection, MCP server risks, and agent prompt injection vectors.

Feature	Description
Security Auditor	Scans .claude/ directory for vulnerabilities
Multiple Surfaces	CLI, GitHub Action, GitHub App integration
Auto-Fix	Replaces hardcoded secrets with env var references
Graded Reports	Security score (0-100) with findings breakdown
Opus Pipeline	Three-agent adversarial analysis with Anthropic API
Evidence Pack	Portable audit bundle for compliance

What can AgentShield detect?

Category	Examples
Secrets	Hardcoded API keys, tokens, private keys, connection strings
Permissions	Overly permissive allow rules like Bash(*)
Hooks	Hook injection vectors, unsafe hooks
MCP Servers	MCP server risks, malicious MCP configs
Agents	Agent prompt injection vectors

How to get started?

Quick Start (no install):

npx ecc-agentshield scan

Install globally:

npm install -g ecc-agentshield
agentshield scan

Auto-fix safe issues:

agentshield scan --fix

What output formats are available?

Format	Use Case
Default	Terminal graded security report
JSON	CI pipelines and automation
HTML	Executive security report
Evidence Pack	Portable audit bundle for compliance

What is the Opus Pipeline?

The Opus Pipeline is a three-agent adversarial analysis that runs on Claude Opus through the Anthropic API:

1. Attacker: hunts for exploitable weaknesses in the scanned config
2. Defender: proposes concrete hardening for each weakness
3. Auditor: reconciles both views into a ranked risk assessment

Usage:

agentshield scan --opus --stream

What is MiniClaw?

MiniClaw is a sandboxed agent runtime included with AgentShield:

• Prompt Router: Strips 12+ injection pattern categories
• Tool Whitelist: Safe/Guarded/Restricted tiers
• Sandbox: Isolated filesystem, path traversal blocked
• HTTP API: REST endpoints for session management

Is AgentShield free and open source?

Yes! AgentShield is MIT licensed and free to use. Built at the Claude Code Hackathon (Cerebral Valley x Anthropic, Feb 2026).

How to contribute?

Contributions welcome! Check the repository for issues and pull requests. See CONTRIBUTING.md for guidelines.

Where to get help?

Resource	Link
Repository	github.com/affaan-m/agentshield
npm Package	npmjs.com/package/ecc-agentshield
Changelog	CHANGELOG.md
Everything Claude Code	github.com/affaan-m/everything-claude-code
Twitter	@affaanmustafa

License

MIT

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